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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - BILL OF ATTAINDER - FIFTH CIRCUIT
HOLDS THAT THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS ACT OF 1996 ARE NOT A BILL OF ATTAINDER. - SBC Com-
munications, Inc. v. FCC, I54 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 889 (i999).
Neither Congress nor the states may pass bills of attainder.' Inso-
far as it enjoins legislatures from the judicial task of imposing pun-
ishments on specific persons, this proscription has both structural and
substantive dimensions. 2 The Bill of Attainder Clauses seem a par-
ticularly promising source for novel constitutional claims given the
current Supreme Court's receptiveness to arguments based on separa-
tion of powers 3 and unexplored but substantively germane text.4 SBC
Communications, a regional telephone company, successfully invoked
the attainder provisions when it persuaded a district court in Texas5 to
invalidate line-of-business restrictions imposed by the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996.6 In SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC,7 however,
the Fifth Circuit reversed.8 Though it rejected SBC's challenge, the
court declined to question the applicability of attainder protections to
corporations contesting particularized economic legislation, and instead
relied on the infirm distinction between "punishment" and "regulation"
to decide the case. In so doing, it imprudently left the door open to fu-
ture bill of attainder attacks on economic legislation in a vital, fluid
industry. Instead, the court should have clarified that the Clauses pro-
tect a targeted group's political freedoms, not its economic rights.
Acknowledging the lack of a coherent regulatory scheme for the
sprawling telecommunications industry, and seeking to substitute the
legislature's imprimatur for the judicial consent decree then controlling
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, ci. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder... shall be passed."); id. art. I, § o,
ci. i ("No State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder.").
2 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 1o-4 to io-6, at
641-63 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the history and role of the bill of attainder provisions).
3 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, i8 S. Ct. 2091, 21o8-io (r998) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (concluding that the line-item veto violates the separation of powers).
4 Justice Thomas appears to be the member of the Court most amenable to new doctrinal
challenges. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 (1997) (Thomas J., concurring) (in-
timating that federal gun control statutes might violate the Second Amendment); Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 6io (x997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(urging the Court to abandon the dormant commerce clause and decide the constitutionality of a
discriminatory state tax under the Import-Export Clause).
5 See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, oo8 (N.D. Tex. r997), rev'd, 154
F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 2998), cert. denied, x9 S. Ct. 889 (2999).
6 The relevant provisions are codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-275 (Supp. I997).
7 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, iig S. Ct. 889 (1999).
8 See id. at 247.
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the dissolution of AT&T's local monopolies, 9 Congress passed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act"). 10 Sections 271 to
276 of the 1996 Act, the "Special Provisions Concerning Bell Operating
Companies" (the "Special Provisions"), imposed line-of-business restric-
tions on the Bell operating companies ("BOCs")" that had emerged
from the break-up of AT&T to control telephone networks in desig-
nated local access and transport areas ("LATAs"). 12 The BOCs, by
name, were prohibited from competing in long distance and other
markets until they had fulfilled a list of conditions intended to ensure
fair competition in their respective local markets.13
One of the BOCs, SBC Communications, filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas alleging that
the Special Provisions were a bill of attainder in which Congress
sought to punish the BOCs for the anticompetitive practices of their
parent, AT&T.14 The trial court agreed that proscribing the BOCs
from immediate entry into interLATA markets was an attainder. 15
In a 2-i decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed. 16 Judge Jolly 7 applied a two-pronged attainder test, asking,
first, whether "the legislature [had] acted with specificity" by singling
out individuals or groups, and, second, whether it had "imposed pun-
ishment."' 8 The court chose not to address the question whether the
specificity prong was satisfied, or the question whether the attainder
provisions applied at all to corporate entities, 19 deciding that the pun-
ishment prong was dispositive.2 0 The court assessed "punishment" for
attainder purposes by applying a three-factor test: "(i) whether the
9 See SBC Communications Inc. v. FCC, 138 F.3d 410, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982) (setting forth the consent de-
cree), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 46o U.S. iooi (1983).
10 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 1io Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§
151-614 (Supp. II 1997)).
11 The 1996 Act identifies the "Bell operating compan[ies]" by name at 47 U S.C. § I53(4).
12 See id. §§ 271-276. The restrictions covered interLATA services by the BOCs (§ 271) and
their affiliates (§ 272), equipment manufacture (§ 273), electronic publishing (§ 274), alarm moni-
toring (§ 275), and pay telephones (§ 276). SBC did not challenge section 276 of the Act. See SBC
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 98I F Supp. 996, 999-1ooo (N.D. Tex. 1997), rev'd, i54 F.3 d 226
(5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 889 (1999).
13 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 271(a) ("Neither a Bell operating company, nor any affiliate of a Bell
operating company, may provide interLATA services except as provided in this section.").
14 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at 1007. SBC also claimed that the Special Provi-
sions violated the principle of separation of powers and the Equal Protection Clause, and that
section 274's restrictions on electronic publishing offended the First Amendment See id. at 999-
iooo. The district court did not reach these claims, see id. at ioo8; however, the Fifth Circuit de-
nied them on appeal, see SBC Communications, 154 F.3d at 244-47.
15 See SBC Communications, 981 F. Supp. at lOO8.
16 See SBC Communications, 154 F.3d at 229.
17 Judge Barksdale joined Judge Jolly's opinion.
18 SBC Communications, 154 F.3 d at 233.
19 See id. at 234.
20 See id. at 235, 244.
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challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative
punishment; (2) whether the statute, 'viewed in terms of the type and
severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpu-
nitive legislative purposes'; and (3) whether the legislative record
'evinces a congressional intent to punish.' 21
Judge Jolly answered all three questions in the negative.22 First, he
found no punishment, as the word has historically been defined, be-
cause the Special Provisions allow the BOCs access to interLATA
markets if they meet specified conditions, 23 and thus "do not impose a
perpetual bar on the BOCs' entry into any of life's avocations. '24 Sec-
ond, Judge Jolly found a qualifying "nonpunitive purpose" in that the
Special Provisions were enacted "to ensure fair competition" in the
telecommunications markets.25 Third, he concluded that neither the
legislative history nor the express terms of the Special Provisions pre-
sented "the 'smoking gun' evidence of punitive intent necessary to es-
tablish a bill of attainder."26 In addition to the three-factor test, the
court emphasized that the Special Provisions were "part of a larger
quid pro quo" in which the BOCs and regulators had negotiated a
"hard-fought compromise" that "contained both good and bad ele-
ments for the BOCs." 27  Certainly, Judge Jolly reasoned, the BOCs'
participation, input, and acquiescence in the political process im-
peached the claim that the resultant legislation was punitive.28
In dissent, Judge Smith maintained that the Special Provisions
were an unconstitutional bill of attainder.29  First, he contended that
the majority was wrong in implying that "prophylactic" measures
against future antitrust violations did not constitute punishment for
attainder purposes.30 He argued, rather, that employment bars fit the
historical definition of punishment whether or not they are retribu-
tive,31 and that because the Special Provisions constituted such a bar,
they were an attainder.32 Second, Judge Smith asserted that the pro-
hibition against bills of attainder was necessary to preserve the separa-
21 Id. at 242 (quoting Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S.
841, 852 (z984) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475-76, 478 (I977)).
For an earlier application of the test to an attack on section 274 of the z996 Act, see BellSouth
Corp. v. FCC, 144 .3d 58, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
22 See SBC Communications, 154 F3d at 242-44.
23 See 47 U.S.C. § 271(c) (Supp. II 997).
24 SBC Communications, 154 F.3d at 242-43.
25 Id. at 243.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 244; see also SBC Communications Inc. v. FCC, 138 F3d 410, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
("As might be expected for an issue of this economic significance, an extended lobbying struggle
[produced] a compromise between the competing factions.").
28 See SBC Communications, 154 F.3d at 244.
29 See id. at 247-53 (Smith, J., dissenting).
30 See id. at 248-51.
31 See id. at 25o-51.
32 See id. at 253.
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tion of powers. 33 He cautioned that Congress's role was to enact gen-
eral laws for courts to enforce against specific individuals, and that by
targeting the BOCs, the legislature had clearly usurped the proper
function of the judiciary 34
Though the Fifth Circuit prudently rejected SBC's attack, its reli-
ance on the two-pronged attainder inquiry overstates the potential
reach of the bill of attainder provisions and thus invites continued
challenges to the 1996 Act. Rather, the court should have made clear
that the Bill of Attainder Clauses protect political minorities from tar-
geted punishment by majoritarian legislatures; they do not protect cor-
porations that have participated in the generative political process
from particularized economic legislation.
The modern attainder test is unworkable. First, it is unclear
whether the specificity prong - the requirement that bills of attainder
must single out individuals or groups 35 - is merely a formal tripwire
triggered by naming per se, or a more functional test in which naming
is relevant but not dispositive. The majority here, 36 and the two twen-
tieth-century Supreme Court cases in which an attainder was found, 37
imply a formal naming requirement, but the current Court has sug-
gested otherwise. 38 If, as Nixon indicates, the specificity prong can be
avoided by any naming - even of one person - for which Congress
can offer a rational, nonpunitive basis,39 the prong seems toothless and
theoretically indistinguishable from the punishment prong. At the
same time, using naming as a per se trigger makes the test too rigid -
both missing attainders phrased in deceptively general language, and
catching nonattainders in which parties are nonetheless named, as in
Nixon. Thus, whether applied formally or functionally, the specificity
prong defers any real analytical work to the punishment prong.
But the punishment test, too, is indeterminate. The characteriza-
tion of suspect legislation as punishment or regulation turns on how
one defines baseline entitlements. Because the majority assumed that
33 See id. at 252.
34 See id. at 252-53.
35 See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 469-72 (I977).
36 See SBC Communications, I54 F.3d at 234 n.12 (stating in dicta that it is "probably a safe
assumption" that the Special Provisions satisfy the specificity requirement because they "identify
the burdened parties by name").
37 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 438-39 n.I (1965) (striking down as a bill of at-
tainder a law that made it a crime for anyone "who is or has been a member of the Communist
Party" to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,
305 n.5 (1946) (finding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting payment of government salaries to
alleged Communists "Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Junior, and Robert Morss Lovett").
38 Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (I995) ("[Liaws that impose a duty
or liability upon a single individual or firm are not on that account invalid - or else we would
not have the extensive jurisprudence that we do concerning the Bill of Attainder Clause ....").
39 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472 (reasoning functionally that the specificity test was not met by a
law that targeted "former President Richard M. Nixon" because the naming could be "fairly and
rationally understood" as designating a "legitimate class of one").
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the BOCs had no absolute right to long distance market access,40 it
logically concluded that Congress could place reasonable temporary
conditions on such access.41 The dissent, in contrast, assumed that, the
BOCs had an unqualified right to market access and likened the Spe-
cial Provisions to unconstitutional incarceration, unredeemed by the
temporary and conditional nature of the restrictions. 42
Given the indeterminacy of the attainder test, the Fifth Circuit
should have decided the case on the threshold issue of whether attain-
der protection is available to corporations fighting particularized eco-
nomic legislation of the type at issue in the 1996 Act.43 It should not
be. For the Bill of Attainder Clauses to fulfill-their jointly structural
and substantive function, and to reconcile the relevant caselaw, the at-
tainder test should ascertain whether the legislature has imposed pun-
ishment on specified individuals or groups for countermajoritarian po-
litical activities or beliefs. The clauses serve to check the state or
federal legislature's power to impose punishments on specified persons
and thereby perpetuate the majority's political judgments against un-
popular or powerless individuals or groups. 44 Specific punishment is
thus reserved for the judiciary, the countermajoritarian branch of gov-
ernment; the encroachment of the legislature, the majoritarian branch,
upon this paradigmatic countermajoritarian function is the essence of
objectionable interference with the separation of powers.
The core right implicated by the Bill of Attainder Clauses, then, is
a political freedom from the majority's power to single out political
minorities for punishment, not a right to be free from particularized
bars to market access. The landmark cases in the Supreme Court's at-
tainder jurisprudence have uniformly assumed that, to be struck down,
legislative punishment must be politically motivated, usually by doubts
about a political minority's loyalty.45 Although majoritarian punish-
40 See SBC Communications, i54 F.3d at 243-44 (characterizing the Special Provisions as "a
prophylactic, compromise regulation of the BOCs' local market power" (emphasis added)).
41 See id. at 242-43.
42 See id. at 249 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause cannot be avoided sim-
ply by inserting into the statute a means of escape. The fact that the federal government holds
the key to the Baby Bells' prison is irrelevant.").
43 While the Fifth Circuit did not decide this issue, because it found that the Special Provi-
sions were not punishment, Judge Jolly speculated that the attainder protections applied to corpo-
rations, reasoning by analogy to other constitutional rights that had been made available to corpo-
rations. See SBC Communications, 154 F.3 d at 234 n.ii (citing United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (double jeopardy); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (freedom of speech)).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 453 (i965) (noting that "the overwhelming
majority of English and early American bills of attainder" targeted political groups); cf Note, Be-
yond Process: A Substantive Rationale for the Bill of Attainder Clause, 7o VA. L. REV. 475, 476
(1984) ("[The] constitutional purpose [of the Clause] is best found in shielding political activity
protected by the first amendment from retroactive legislative sanctions.").
4S Several cases have assumed that the Bill of Attainder Clauses protect against improper, po-
litically motivated punishment of specific persons. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433
I999] 1389
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ment has frequently taken the form of employment bars, such bars
should not be deemed bills of attainder when enacted for economic
motives against politically empowered corporations. 46
By persuading the court to decide a novel challenge under the tra-
ditional two-pronged attainder test, the BOCs have cleared the way
for future bill of attainder challenges to particularized economic legis-
lation.47 The prospect of an ultimately successful attainder attack on
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 harks back to the now-discredited
jurisprudence of the Lochner48 era. Just as the Lochner-era Court was
forced to decide upon the constitutionality of uniform wage49 and
work hour 0 regulations that facially burdened the "right of free con-
tract,"'" today's courts must decide the constitutionality of particular-
ized legislation that implicates the Bill of Attainder Clauses by naming
specific parties. Confronted with this dilemma, courts should jettison
old, unworkable tests5 2 and deny attainder protection to corporations
challenging particularized economic legislation. Congress and the ad-
ministrative agencies may need such customized regulatory tools to re-
strain specific companies likely to "lock in" insurmountable positions
in emerging markets due to their current dominance in technologically
proximate markets. 53 The Bill of Attainder Clauses, accordingly,
should be reserved for an extraordinary and constitutionally para-
mount purpose: the protection of political minorities singled out for
punishment by majoritarian legislatures.
U.S. 425, 474-75 (1977) (characterizing employment bars that constitute attainders as "a mode of
punishment commonly employed against those legislatively branded as disloyal"); Brown, 381
U.S. at 443 (describing the constitutional protection against bills of attainder as a "bulwark
against tyranny"); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327 (1867) (invalidating, as a bill
of attainder, loyalty oaths for the ministry "intended especially to operate upon parties who...
had aided or countenanced the [Confederate] Rebellion").
46 Of course, the protections may still be available to groups generally and to corporations spe-
cifically insofar as challenged legislation effects a punishment for political disloyalty.
47 Another BOC, BellSouth, focused an earlier attack on section 274 of the 1996 Act. See
BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3 d 58, 6o (D.C. Cir. i998). BellSouth subsequently filed another
attack on section 271, which the D.C. Circuit denied. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3 d 678,
680 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
48 Lochner v. New York, i98 U.S. 45 (i9o5).
49 See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 539-40 (1923).
5o See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
51 Id. at 57.
52 Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 777 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring) ("[A]ppreciating the fluidity of the subject that Congress must regulate is
simply to accept the fact that not every nuance of our old standards will necessarily do for the
new technology ... ").
53 See generally W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN
THE ECONOMY 1-29 (1994) (theorizing about lock-in effects in a high-technology economy).
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